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     JOINT CRIMINAL CONFUSION 
 
 
Joint Criminal Confusion: Exploring the 
merits and demerits of joint enterprise 
liability  
 
 
Elies van Sliedregt 
 
In February 2016, the UK Supreme Court fundamentally changed the criminal law principles 
of accessorial liability when it handed down its decision in R v Jogee. The Court abolished the 
head of liability known as 'joint criminal enterprise' (JCE) and replaced it with the ordinary 
principles of aiding and abetting, which it re-stated for this purpose. JCE features prominently 
in international criminal law (ICL) where it has an equally contentious status. The full 
implications of Jogee remain at present uncertain, underexplored and divisive. In this chapter, 
I evaluate the merits and demerits of joint enterprise by comparing JCE in English law and 
ICL. A cross-jurisdictional analysis of joint enterprise reveals more deeply the role the notion 
plays in the overall taxonomy of criminal responsibility. There are different concepts of joint 
enterprise with different theoretical groundings. By not recognising this, past debates of joint 
HQWHUSULVHOLDELOLW\KDYHIDLOHGWRDSSUHFLDWHWKHFRQFHSW¶VPHULWVDORQJVLGHFRPplicity liability. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
On 18 February 2016 in the cases of R v Jogee and ± sitting as Privy Council ± 
in Ruddock v The Queen (hereinafter Jogee) 1 , the UK Supreme Court, by 
restating the principles of joint enterprise liability, curbed MRLQW HQWHUSULVH¶V
broad boundaries and, by equating it to complicity liability, essentially 
abolished the concept altogether. 2  This was a landslide decision 3  that was 
welcomed by many in the legal community, scholars, legal practitioners and 
                                                 
 7KLV LV DQ H[WHQGHGYHUVLRQRI WKHDXWKRU¶V LQDXJXUDODGGUHVV KHOGDW8QLYHUVLW\ RI/HHGV
School of Law on 1 December 2016. 
1 R v Jogee >@8.6&DWµ5HVWDWHPHQWRI3ULQFLSOHV¶ 
2 0'\VRQµ6KRUQRII-FRPSOLFLW\¶Cambridge Law Journal)6WDUN µ7KH'HPLVHRI
3DUDVLWLF $FFHVVRULDO /LDELOLW\´ 6XEVWDQWLYH -XGLFLDO 5HIRUP 1RW &RPPRQ /DZ
+RXVHNHHSLQJ¶  CLJ 75 (3) 550-579; AP Simester et al., 6LPHVWHU DQG 6XOOLYDQ¶V
Criminal Law, 6th edn, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2016) at 245±6. 
3  For commentaries5%X[WRQµ-RJHHXSKHDYDOLQVHFRQGDU\OLDELOLW\IRUPXUGHU¶CLR 
324±333; '2UPHURGDQG./DLUGµ-RJHHQRWWKHHQGRIDOHJDOVDJDEXWWKHVWDUWRIRQH"
(2016) CLR 539±552; M. Dyson and R. Buxton, Letter to the Editor, 2016 CLR 638±643; AP 
6LPHVWHUµ$FFHVVRU\/LDELOLW\DQG&RPPRQ8QODZIXO3XUSRVH¶Law Quarterly Review 2017, 
73±90. 
 Chapter in Beatrice Krebs (ed.), Accessorial Liability After Jogee (Hart Publishing 
2019) 
2 
 
     JOINT CRIMINAL CONFUSION 
activists.4 The concept of joint enterprise had been over-extended5 and the law 
was complicated. It enabled a conviction for murder of those on the margins of 
wrongdoing whilst being so complex that it led to a very high number of appeals 
(22 per cent of appeals in 2013).   
Over the years, a rich debate had developed around the theory of joint 
enterprise, not just in English law. 6  The concept features prominently in 
international criminal law (ICL) where it has an equally contentious status. 7 
Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) in ICL is largely based on the English doctrine 
of common purpose, the precursor of joint enterprise in English law. This 
explains why joint enterprise in English law and in ICL share a number of 
features. First, joint enterprise developed alongside complicity to capture 
group conduct that does not fit the strictures of complicity liability. Second, 
joint enterprise in both English law and ICL is prone to over-expansion as a 
UHVXOWRIWKHORRVHWHUPLQRORJ\RIµSXUVXLQJDFRPPRQFULPLQDOSXUSRVH¶DQG
µEHLQJ FRQFHUQHG LQ¶ WKH FULPH )LQDOO\ WKH QDWXUH RI MRLQW HQWHUSULVH LV
ambiguous. Joint enterprise in both English law and ICL has a hybrid nature; 
it complies with principles of cause-based complicity liability yet can also be 
viewed as agency liability.8  In English law and in ICL, the debate on joint 
enterprise liability has clustered around three issues: (i) its broad foresight-test 
(ii) its nature, and (iii) its propensity to expand.  
To date, the debates on joint enterprise in English law and ICL have not 
been linked. This is not surprising since they exist in separate legal spheres and 
epistemic communities. Yet with Jogee this has changed. It has been argued 
                                                 
4 (J*9LUJR-RLQW(QWHUSULVHLV'HDG/RQJ/LYH$FFHVVRULDO/LDELOLW\¶>@Crim LR 850; 
::LOVRQDQG'2UPHURG µ6LPSO\+DUVKWR)DLUO\6LPSOH-RLQW(QWHUSULVH5HIRUP¶
Crim LR &6M|OLQµ.LOOLQJWKH3DUDVLWH¶Nottingham Law Journal 129±140. See also 
the website of the JENGbA Campaign who fight against the Joint Enterprise Law: 
jointenterprise.co 
5  Leading to many convictions, see: M McClenaghan, M McFadyean and R Stevenson, 
µ5HYHDOHG7KRXVDQGV3URVHFXWHG8QGHU&RQWURYHUVLDO/DZRI-RLQW(QWHUSULVH¶ 
available at www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2014-03-31/data-joint-enterprise-in-
numbers (accessed 8 October 2018). 
6 (J-&6PLWK µ&ULPLQDO/LDELOLW\RI$FFHVVRULHV/DZDQG5HIRUP¶ LQR 453; AP 
6LPHVWHU µ7KH 0HQWDO (OHPHQW LQ &RPSOLFLW\¶  LQR  % .UHEV µ-RLQW &ULPLQDO
(QWHUSULVH¶MLR 578; B KUHEVµ0HQV5HDLQ-RLQW(QWHUSULVH$5ROHIRU(QGRUVHPHQW"
(2015) CLJ 480±0'\VRQµ7KH)XWXUHRI-RLQW-Up Thinking: Living in a Post-accessory 
/LDELOLW\:RUOG¶Journal of Criminal Law 181±$*UHHQDQG&0F*RXUOD\ µ7KH
wolf packs in ouUPLGVWDQGRWKHUSURGXFWVRIFULPLQDOHQWHUSULVHSURVHFXWLRQV¶Journal 
of Criminal Law 280±297. 
7 (J-60DUWLQH]DQG$0'DQQHUµGuilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command 
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal LDZ¶ (2005) 93 Calififornia 
Law Review 75; SS Powles, Joint Criminal Enterprise ± Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial 
Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity, (2004) JICJ 606; -' 2KOLQ µ7KUHH &RQFHSWXDO 3UREOHPV
ZLWKWKH'RFWULQHRI-RLQW&ULPLQDO(QWHUSULVH¶JICJ, 69±+*YDQGHU:LOWµ-RLQW
&ULPLQDO(QWHUSULVH3RVVLELOLWLHVDQG/LPLWDWLRQV¶ JICJ (2007), 91±108; E. van Sliedregt, 
µ-RLQW&ULPLQDO(QWHUSULVHDVD 3DWKZD\WR&RQYLFWLQJ,QGLYLGXDOVIRU*HQRFLGH¶(2007) 5 JICJ 
184±207.  
8 See ch 2 in this volume. 
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that JCE in ICL lacks a legal basis after the UKSC in Jogee essentially abolished 
the concept of joint enterprise. This argument was put forward by counsel for 
Jogee who took their fight to the international tribunal in the case against 
Radovan .DUDGåLü. They argued that his conviction should be quashed now that 
the UKSC found that the law on joint enterprise had taken a µwrong turn¶.9 A 
similar case had been EURXJKWE\-RJHH¶VFRXQVHObefore the Hong Kong Court 
of Final Appeal in the case of Chan Kam Shing.10  
So far, Jogee has not led to abolishing joint enterprise in jurisdictions 
outside England and Wales. It was not followed by the highest courts in 
Australia and Hong Kong. The Australian High Court found that extended joint 
enterprise was still good law11 and the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal held 
that the law did not take a wrong turn12. On 20 March 2019, the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber in the .DUDGåLücase found that it was not bound by findings of the 
UKSC (or any other domestic or international court).13 It held that a shift in 
domestic law should not compel the tribunal to change "well-established 
jurisprudence" on JCE, not in the least since Jogee "has not been followed in 
other common law jurisdictions". 14   Indeed, the fact that joint enterprise 
continues to exist in jurisdictions outside England and Wales, undermines the 
persuasiveness of the legal argument in Jogee. Furthermore, it calls into 
question the decision to align joint enterprise liability to complicity. In ICL, 
JCE has always been distinguished from complicity/aiding and abetting 
liability. This makes comparing joint enterprise in ICL and in English law so 
interesting; it allows us to explore the added value of joint enterprise liability 
alongside complicity.  
In this chapter, I challenge the view that we can do without joint 
enterprise and fully rely on complicity liability. The premise of the chapter is 
WKDWZKLOHWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VUXOLQJLQJogee may be welcomed for clarifying 
how joint enterprise comports to complicity, by aligning it fully to complicity 
liability, it has curtailed it too much. A cross-jurisdictional comparison and 
analysis of joint enterprise reveals more deeply the role the notion plays in the 
overall taxonomy of criminal responsibility. Analysis of joint enterprise in 
English law and ICL reveals there are different concepts of joint enterprise with 
different theoretical groundings. By not recognising this, past debates of joint 
                                                 
9  Counsel for Jogee submitted a motion before the United Nations Mechanism for 
International Tribunals (UNMICT), the successor body to the ICTY, has been asked to review 
JCE Karadåiü appeal. See Prosecutor v Karadåiü (Trial Chamber, Case No IT-95-5/18-T, 24 
March 2016), Submissions available online at www.unmict.org/en/cases/mict-13-55. A similar 
case had been argued before the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in the case of Chan Kan 
Shing: HKSHAR v Chan Kam Shing, FACC 2017.  
10 HKSHAR v Chan Kam Shing, FACC 2017. 
11 Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30. 
12 HKSHAR v Chan Kam Shing)$&&)RUDFRPPHQWDU\%.UHEVµ+RQJ.RQJ&RXUWRI
)LQDO$SSHDO'LYLGHGE\D&RPPRQ3XUSRVH¶Journal of Criminal Law 271±274. 
13 Prosecutor v Karadåiü (Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-95-5/18-T, 20 March 2019), para. 
434. 
14 Ibidem, para 436. 
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enterprise liability have failed to appreciate the cRQFHSW¶V PHULWV DORQJVLGH
complicity liability. 
Evaluating the merits and demerits of joint enterprise informs debates 
in both English law, ICL and beyond. Joint enterprise is still relevant in 
common law jurisdictions outside England and features prominently in 
statutes of international courts and tribunals. Rather than committing joint 
enterprise to the history books as a result of Jogee15, I argue we need to rethink 
it. One way of doing that is by understanding its rise and learning from its fall.  
I take three steps to build my argument. In the first step 
µ8QGHUVWDQGLQJ-RLQW(QWHUSULVH/LDELOLW\¶, I discuss joint enterprise in each 
of the two jurisdictions that are central to the analysis. I will start with English 
law after which I discuss joint enterprise in ICL. This is an elaborate and 
lengthy part of the overall argument but is essential as the basis on which I 
build my argument. I discuss the origins, development and nature of joint 
enterprise liability. In the second step µDetermining its Merit¶), I discuss 
inchoate complicity and the relationship between joint enterprise liability and 
complicity. In the third step µ5HGUDZLQJ%RXQGDULHV¶, I propose new ways of 
OLPLWLQJ EURDG µcollateral¶ notions of joint enterprise. Unlike the UKSC in 
Jogee, I conclude that there still is a place for collateral joint enterprise. The 
argument that follows from the analysis and that underpins the conclusion is 
that mens rea and actus reus should be viewed in terms of a hydraulic 
relationship or a set of scales: when we attach less weight to one, the other 
should be bolstered. When a foresight-test is employed there has to be a stricter 
actus reus outweighing the mens rea, preventing an imbalance and over-
expansion.  
 
STEP I: Understanding Joint Enterprise   
 
II. Joint Enterprise as Collateral Liability 
 
Joint enterprise is based on the common law doctrine of common purpose16 
and is applied in a number of jurisdictions: England and Wales, Canada, 
Australia, South Africa and Hong Kong and in ICL. In its basic form, it enables 
holding secondary party D2 criminally liable for the crime that was the subject 
of an unlawful common purpose (crime A), pursued by both D2 and D1 and 
                                                 
15 Counsel for Jogee, after the UKSC decision in Jogee/Ruddock, submitted a motion before 
the United Nations Mechanism for International Tribunals (UNMICT), the successor body to 
the ICTY, has been asked to review JCE Karadåiü appeal. See Prosecutor v Karadåiü (Trial 
Chamber, Case No IT-95-5/18-T, 24 March 2016), Submissions available online at 
www.unmict.org/en/cases/mict-13-55. 
16 For an overview see Stark, supra n 2. See also KJM Smith, A Modern Treatise on the Law of 
Criminal Complicity (Oxford Monographs on Criminal Law & Justice), 209±234. 
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committed by the principal-perpetrator D1 µin pursuance of the common 
intent¶.17  
More controversial is the collateral modality of joint enterprise where 
D2 is liable for the further or extended crime (crime B) committed by D1 in the 
course of committing crime A, and which D2 foresaw while continuing to 
participate in the enterprise. The collateral modality KDVEHHQWHUPHGµSDUDVLWLF
DFFHVVRULDO OLDELOLW\¶ (PAL) 18  in English law, and µextended¶ MRLQW FULPLQDO
enterprise (JCE) liability in Australian law and ICL. PAL is most controversial 
in murder cases where secondary participant D2 is found guilty of murder 
despite the lack of intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. To illustrate the 
workings of joint enterprise liability I briefly discuss the Jogee case. 
 Jogee and Hirsi had gone to the home of the victim (Fyfe) and behaved 
aggressively. Hirsi stabbed Fyfe who died of his wounds. Jogee had come beside 
Hirsi in the area where the stabbing took place, with a bottle raised in his hand, 
leaning towards Fyfe saying he wanted to smash the bottle over his head. Both 
were convicted for murder. The judge had directed the jury that Jogee was 
guilty of murder if he took part in the attack on Fyfe and realised that it was 
possible that Hirsi might use the knife with intent to cause serious harm. 
Foresight sufficed as intent for murder. 
 The UK Supreme Court adopted a more stringent approach. First of all, 
it held that for a murder conviction proof is required that Jogee (D2) 
encouraged or assisted Hirsi (D1) to commit murder (crime B).19 Pursuing a 
common criminal purpose is no longer relevant for liability of D2; liability is 
FRQVWUXHG DORQJ WKH OLQHV RI µRUGLQDU\¶ FRPSOLFLW\ ,Q 6LPHVWHU¶V ZRUGV DOO
IRUPVRIFRPSOLFLW\PXVWQRZEHFKDQQHOOHGWKURXJKWKHµDLGDEHWFRunsel, or 
procure formula ± LQ HVVHQFH HQFRXUDJHPHQW RU DVVLVWDQFH¶ 20  Assisting or 
encouraging is more precise language than 'taking part in an attack' (jury 
instruction).  The Supreme Court holds that assisting or encouraging does not 
require active engagement in the stabbing; agreement (to go to the house of 
Fyfe and threaten him) can be a form of encouragement.21 More generally, the 
court found that supportive presence, when there is no agreement and people 
come together spontaneously to commit an offence, can be encouragement 
triggering liability for crime B. 22  Secondly, with regard to mens rea, the 
Supreme Court held that the law took a µwrong turn¶ in the case of Chan Wing-
Siu where foresight was considered sufficient for murder.23 Instead, the Court 
found that foresight is evidence of intent rather than intent proper.24 When D2 
is party to a violent attack and has no intent for murder yet the violence 
                                                 
17 R v Macklin (1838) 2 Lew. CC225, 168 ER 1136.  
18 The expression was coined by JC Smith (1997), supra, n 6. 
19 R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [78]. 
20 Simester, supra n 3, at 75. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23  R v Chan Wing-Siu [1985] AC 168 [86]. 
24 [87]. 
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escalates and results in death caused by D1, D2 is not guilty of murder. 25 
Instead, if D2 participates in an attack, which µall sober and reasonable people¶ 
realise carries the risk of µsome harm (not necessarily serious) to another¶, and 
death in fact results, D2 is guilty of manslaughter.26  
A concept similar to PAL exists in ICL: extended JCE or Third Category 
JCE (JCE3) 27 . It has been applied for the first time by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and concerns those cases 
where a person agrees to a common purpose to commit crime A and one of the 
confederates to the joint venture goes further and commits crime B, which, 
while outside of the common purpose, was foreseen by D2 as a natural and 
foreseeable consequence of pursuing that common purpose.28  
Other international courts, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), and the Extraordinary Chambers of 
the Court of Cambodia (ECCC aka the Cambodia Tribunal) apply variants of 
the theory.29 The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) provides for 
common purpose-liability in Article 25(3)(d) which, read in conjunction with 
the provision on the mental element ± Article 30 ICC Statute ± rules out 
collateral joint enterprise since the latter provision requires that µin relation to 
a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it 
will occur in the ordinary course of events [emphasis added, EvS]¶.30 This is 
stricter than foreseeing the possibility of a crime. 
 
III. The Elusive Concept of PAL 
 
A. Common Purpose: non-collateral joint enterprise 
                                                 
25 [95±6]. 
26 [96]. 
27 3URVHFXWRUY7DGLüJudgment, Case No IT-94-1-A, ICTY, A. Ch., July 15, 1999, para 196, 228, 
See further, section 5.A. 
28 Ibid. 
29 For an overview, see L Yanev, Theories of Co-perpetration, (Brill/Nijhof: Dordrecht, 2018); 
N Jain, Perpetrators and Accessories in International Criminal Law: Individual Modes of 
Responsibility for Collective Crimes (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014); R Cryer et al., An 
Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); G Boas et al., International Criminal Law Practitioner Library, 
Elements of Crimes under International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
30 The ICC Statute provides for a broad concept of co-perpetration where liability is premised 
on pursuing a common plan, making it overlap with certain aspects of common purpose 
liability in art 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute. Co-perpetration, however, requires proof of an 
µHVVHQWLDOFRQWULEXWLRQ¶WRWKHFRPPRQSXUSRVHZKLFKLVQRWWKHFDVHZLWKFRPPRQSXUSRVHLQ
art 25(3)(d) of the Statute. See on the differences and overlap between common purpose 
liability and co-SHUSHWUDWLRQ/<DQHY µOn Common Plans and Excess Crimes: Fragmenting 
the Notion of Co-3HUSHWUDWLRQ LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO /DZ¶  Leiden Journal of 
International Law 1-26;  0&XSLGR µ&RPPRQ3XUSRVH/LDELOLW\ YHUVXV -RLQW(QWHUSULVH$
3UDFWLFDO 9LHZ RQ WKH ,&&
V +LHUDUFK\ RI /LDELOLW\ 7KHRULHV¶  Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 897±915. 
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Understanding PAL and how it comports to complicity/aiding and abetting 
means going back to the beginning: to common purpose liability, the liability 
theory from which, PAL developed.  
 According to KJM Smith in his magnificent work on criminal complicity, 
it is unclear what motivated the creation of the doctrine of common purpose 
and what its nature, status and relationship to general complicity is. 31 
Throughout the centuries the common law has known the concept by which D1 
and D2 pursue a common criminal purpose to do crime A and where D2, whilst 
present but without proof of having actually assisting or encouraging D1, is 
equally guilty of A. 32 This is the basic form of common purpose liability, where 
crimes remain within the scope of the agreement. 33  It was recognised as a 
distinct theory of liability alongside accessorial liability.34 
At the same time, from its inception common purpose liability was 
closely related to complicity. Common purpose is an amalgam of the mens rea 
and actus reus requirements of complicity of abettors, those who instigate or 
encourage others during the offence.35 Intangible encouragement by way of 
presence is the hallmark of common purpose liability in the older case law. The 
SHUVRQ SUHVHQW LV UHIHUUHG WR DV µSULQFLSDO¶ UDWKHU WKDQ DFFRPSOLFH Hale 
observes:  
If divers come to commit an unlawful act and be present at the time of Felony 
committed, though one of them only doth it, they are all Principals.36  
Presence compensates for the lack of action on the part of D2. Consider 
7XUQHU¶Vth edition of Russell on Crime (1964) where presence pursuant to a 
common purpose is treated as a form of participation: 
if a special verdict against a man as a principal does not show that he did the act, or 
was present when it was done, or did some act at the time in aid which shows that he 
ZDVSUHVHQWKH«FDQQRWEHFRQYLFWHG37 
Over the years, courts have taken a broader view of what constitutes the actus 
reus of aiding or abetting, ie classic complicity. Presence at the scene of a crime 
is generally not required.38 Mere presence, on the other hand, is not sufficient 
for aiding and abetting liability. And here common purpose liability remained 
relevant (pre-Jogee); '¶VSUHVHQFHFRQVWLWXWHs encouragement or assistance 
when it is part of pursuing an agreement to commit a crime. With Jogee this is 
now complicity liability rather than common purpose.39  
                                                 
31 Smith, supra, n 14, at 209. 
32 Simester, supra n 3, at 76; Stark, supra n 2; Smith, supra n 14, 209±232. 
33 R v Tyler and Price (1838); R v Wilkes (1839) 9 Carrington and Payne 437; 173 ER 901; R 
v Skeet (1866) Foster and Finlayson 931; 176 ER 854. See Sjölin, supra n. 2, at 133. 
34 Sjölin, supra n 4, at 130. 
35 Smith, supra n 14, at 224. 
36 Pleas of the Crown (1678) at p 215, Cited by Simester, supra n 3, at 76. 
37 JWC Turner, Russell on Crime, 12th edn (Londo,: Sweet & Maxwell, 1964), at 139. 
38 D Ormerod & K Laird, 6PLWK +RJDQ DQG 2UPHURG¶V &ULPLQDO /DZ, 15th edn, (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2018), at 187. 
39 Ibid, at 193. 
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B. PAL: collateral joint enterprise 
 
Before Jogee, the Court of Appeal distinguished three categories of cases in 
which there is resort to joint enterprise: 
 
1. Where two or more people join in committing a single crime, in circumstances where 
WKH\DUHLQHIIHFWDOOMRLQWSULQFLSDOVµSODLQYDQLOOD¶MRLQWHQWHUSULVH. 
2. Where D assists or encourages P to commit a single crime (accessorial liability). 
3. Where P and D participate together in one crime (crime A) and in the course of it P 
commits a second crime (crime B) which D had foreseen he might commit (PAL). 40 
 
The third category is collateral liability: PAL, with Chan Wing-Siu41 being the 
leading case. This case will be examined below (section C). First, we need to 
H[SORUH 3$/¶V SHGLJUHH PAL, whilst shrouded in terms of common purpose 
liability, is generally traced back to (collateral forms of) accessorial liability 
before the fact; cases of µvariation¶ where D1 deviates from the common plan 
by committing the further crime (crime B).42 An early example is mentioned in 
)RVWHU¶VCrown Law:  
A adviseth B to rob C, he doth rob him, and in so doing, either upon resistance made, 
or to conceal the fact, or upon any other motive operating at the time of the robbery, 
killeth him. A is accessary to this murder.43  
 
Questions arise over the mens rea-test that justifies attributing responsibility 
for crime B. In Foster's example, liability was premised on an objective test: 
whether crime B, committed by D1, was a probable consequence of the 
advice/instigation by D2. Initially, the probability-test had been applied solely 
to counselling or procuring.44 Eventually it was applied beyond such cases and 
became part of the common purpose lexicon. In later cases, the law moved 
towards requiring a subjective test (intent and foresight) with regard to crime 
B. 45  Thus, PAL developed from an instigation/abetting-type of liability (A 
adviseth B and C) and eventually employed a subjective foresight test. 
While the 'variation rule'  can be viewed as an early precedent of 
collateral liability, we should not ignore differences with PAL. In Foster's 
example the relationship between A (D2) and B (D1) is premised on a one-sided 
relationship of instigation rather than participating in a joint criminal venture 
pursuing a common agreement. Moreover, and related, in variation-cases, the 
                                                 
40 R v A, EWCA Crim 1622; [2011] QB 841 (CA), at [7], 845, per Hughes LJ. 
41 R v Chan Wing-Siu [1985] AC 168 [86]. 
42 Stark, supra n 2. See Smith, supra n 14, 209±222. See also R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, [20±
21]. 
43 M Foster, A Report of Some Proceedings on the Commission for the Trial of the Rebels in the 
Year 1746, in the County of Surry; And of Other Crown Cases: to which are Added Discourses 
Upon a Few Branches of the Crown Law ()RVWHU¶V&URZQ/DZ), at 370. 
44 Stark, supra n 2, 566±67. 
45 Ibid, 568±576. 
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liability of D2 who instigates crime A and is liable for crime B is less of DµPRUDO
VWUHWFK¶ than in PAL-cases, where D2 is liable for B for being present with 
foresight that D1 might commit B. ,Q)RVWHU¶VH[DPSOHthe defendant set the 
chain of events in motion. That is a different moral position than D2 in a PAL-
situation.  
 
C. Chan Wing-Siu: WKHµZLGHUSULQFLSOH¶ 
 
PAL's lineage can be most clearly traced back to the Chan Wing Siu case 
decided in 1985. This is where the µZLGHUprinciple¶RIIRUHVLJKWwas endorsed, 
where D2 was found µcriminally liable for acts by the primary offender of a type 
which the former foresees but does not necessarily intend¶.46 Defendants in this 
case KDGJRQHWRWKHYLFWLP¶VKRXVHWRFROOHFWDGHEWEXWKDGEHHQDWWDFNHGE\
the latter with a knife. Two of the three defendants knew that the others carried 
knives while two denied being involved in the stabbing. All were convicted of 
murder. Foresight with regard to the killing was sufficient for liability for 
murder.  
Chan Wing Siu was approved by the House of Lords in Powell and 
Daniels, English47 and Rahman48. It was endorsed by the Court of Appeal49 
and by the Supreme Court in Gnango.50  Establishing foresight essentially came 
down to proof of knowledge on the part of D2 that D1 carried a weapon that 
was subsequently used to kill the victim. In those cases where the weapon was 
fundamentally different from what D2 thought D1 might use, there was no 
liability µIXQGDPHQWDOO\GLIIHUHQWUXOH¶.51 In Jogee, the Supreme Court rejected 
the foresight-test. It held that Chan Wing-Siu constituted a legal wrong turn.52 
                                                 
46 [1985] AC 168 [86] per Sir Robin Cooke, at 175. 
47 [1999]AC1, [1997] 4 All ER 
48 [2008] UKHL 45. 
49 In a number of cases: R v Smith, EWCA Crim 1342; R v ABCD [2010] EWCA Crim 1622; R v 
Mendez [2010] EWCA Crim 516; R v Lewis [2010] EWCA Crim 496; R v Badza [2010] EWCA 
Crim 1363; R v Montague [2013] EWCA Crim 1781; R v Bristow [2013] EWCA Crim 1540; R v 
Ali [2014] EWCA Crim 2169.   
50 [2011] UKSC 59. This was a rather special case of PAL and some would argue it was not really 
PAL. See for a good discussion J. Herring, Criminal Law, Text, Cases and Materials, 7th edn 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016), 838±848 (discussion in 8th edn (2018) is shorter: 
824±826).  
51 µ>W@KHXVHRIDNQLIHZDVIXQGDPHQWDOO\GLIIHUHQWWRWKHXVHRIDZRRGHQSRVW¶«EXW«µLIWKH
weapon used by the primary party is different to, but as dangerous as, the weapon which the 
secondary party contemplated he might use, the secondary party should not escape liability for 
murder because of the difference in the weapon, for example, if he foresaw that the primary 
party might use a gun to kill and the latter used DNQLIHWRNLOORUYLFHYHUVD¶ Powell and Daniels, 
English, [1999]AC1, [1997] 4 All ER summing up Lord Hutton, at 30. In Jogee, the 
µIXQGDPHQWDOO\GLIIHUHQW-UXOHOLYHVRQLQFLUFXPVFULELQJOLDELOLW\LQFDVHRIDQµRYHUZKHOPLQJ
VXSHUYHQLQJHYHQW¶EUHDNLQg the chain of events: R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 [97]. 
52 Ibid, [3, 82, 83, 85, 87]. 
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)RUHVLJKW DQG NQRZOHGJH RI D ZHDSRQ FDQ VWLOO EH HYLGHQFH RI ZKDW '¶V
LQWHQWLRQZDV%XWµLWLVHYLGHQFHDQGQRPRUH¶53 
This is arguably the biggest change brought about by Jogee. The mens 
rea for secondary participation in murder requires proof that D2 had intent to 
assist or encourage D1 to commit murder. This includes intent that D1 has the 
necessary mens rea for murder. 54  This aligns with complicity/aiding and 
abetting where the aider and abettor is required to act with intent and in the 
knowledge of the essential matters of the crime committed by D1.55 
PAL has unclear origins and since Chan Wing Siu it developed into an 
expansive liability theory employing lax evidentiary standards.56 Aside from 
the broad foresight-test, the actus reus is not much more than agreeing to 
commit crime A, in the course of which crime B is committed. Evidence of 
encouragement or assistance establishing a causal link is not required. Indeed, 
proof of the conspiracy does the work.57 PAL has been particularly problematic 
in murder cases where it comes with  an incongruence: it generates murder 
liability for D2 who has mere foresight RI WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI '¶V intentional 
conduct.  In all this, we are reminded of the fact that murder carries a 
mandatory life sentence. 
 
D. Nature 
 
Is PAL complicity liability or a sui generis mode of liability? As an 'offshoot' of 
WKH µYDULDWLRQ UXOe' of instigation/abetting liability, PAL is cause based 
complicity liability. D2's liability derives from that of D1; he causes D1 to 
commit the crime and is punished  on an equal footing as D1.58 This explains 
                                                 
53 Ibid, [98]. Stark disagrees. In his view, the law on PAL did not take a wrong turn. Stark supra 
n 2 550±579. He traces the foresight-test back to nineteenth century riot and poaching cases 
where D2 was liable for the killing of a constable by D1 during rioting because it could be 
presumed KHVKDUHGDQLQWHQWLRQZLWK3WRµUHVLVWDOORSSRVHUV¶+HDUJXHVWKDWDWacit agreement 
to violently resist opposition is a presumed foresight-test. Stark, supra n 2, at 556, referring to 
M. Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronæ, vol 1 (London 1736), at 443-4. See also Sjölin, supra n 
4, at 133. 
54 R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, [90]. 
55 Johnson v Youden >@.%.%µ>E@HIRUHDSHUVRQFDQEHFRQYLFWHGRIDLGLQJ
DQGDEHWWLQJKHPXVWDWOHDVWNQRZWKHHVVHQWLDOPDWWHUVZKLFKFRQVWLWXWHWKDWRIIHQFH¶ 
56 Research by Dyson shows that the types of evidence used are most commonly phone records 
and CCTV evidence. Phone and CCTV evidence can show how people are linked together. 
Dyson, supra n 6, at 187±188. This practice has had unwarranted social and possibly 
discriminatory consequences. It led the House of Commons Justice Committee to express its 
concern that a large proportion of those convicted of joint enterprise offences are young black 
and mixed race men. House of Commons, Justice Committee, Joint Enterprise: Joint 
Enterprise: Follow-up, 4th Report of Session 2014-15, para 24, at 12. 
57 Simester, supra n 3, at 78. 
58 On causation as the philosophical underpinning for complicity: 6+ .DGLVK µ&RPSOLFLW\
&DXVHDQG%ODPH$6WXG\LQWKH,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRI'RFWULQH¶ California Law Review, 329±
410; HLA Hart and AM Honoré, Causation in the Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1959); J 
*DUGQHUµ&RPSOLFLW\DQG&DXVDOLW\¶LQ-*DUGQHUOffences and Defences: Selected Essays in 
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much of the debate around PAL and its foresight test. As complicity liability, 
PAL would require proof of a contribution to the crime - ie causing the crime - 
coupled with intent and knowledge of the essential matters of the base crime. 
Foresight falls short of this hence the ruling in Jogee where the UKSC brought 
PAL back into the complicity fold, insisting on intent.  
PAL can also be viewed as agency liability, based on an act of 
authorisation and assent. This is because complicity itself can be viewed as 
agency based. Rebecca Williams in Chapter 2 of this volume discusses how the 
law of complicity straddles competing identities of agency and causation.59 A 
number of commentators support the view that complicity is not securely 
anchored in the structure of causation and can be better viewed as premised on 
agency/authorisation.60 As agency, liability is based on association by D2 with 
'¶V DFWLRQV, where the accomplice authorises the SULQFLSDO¶V FRQGXFW. 
Causation plays a reduced role; it explains the connection between D2 and the 
crime but does not rely on it.61  
Complicity liability, when viewed as agency liability, turns on mens rea. 
Relying on authorisation as the theoretical basis for complicity implies that D2 
can only be held liable for acts (s)he authorised. If we regard PAL as agency 
liability, the central question is: to what extent can crime B be regarded as 
authorised when it was collateral?  
The question of the nature of PAL ± cause based or agency-based, 
whether it is distinct from complicity or a form of complicity ± remains 
unresolved to today. In a way, it is no longer relevant since PAL is now aligned 
to complicity in Jogee. More generally, however, it is a pertinent question. If 
collateral joint enterprise is understood as agency and hence mens rea is the 
central tenet of liability, does a foresight-test suffice? In ICL foresight is 
accepted as a test for collateral joint enterprise, as it is in Hong Kong and 
Australian law. Does the fact that it has been rejected in Jogee mean that it is 
incompatible with collateral joint enterprise in general? This is a relevant 
question bearing in mind the foundational role of English law with regard to 
joint enterprise and to which we return in the third part. At this point, we need 
to take a step back and turn to joint enterprise liability in ICL. We start with its 
origins in World War II case law. 
 
 
 
                                                 
the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford,: Oxford University Press, 2007); KJM Smith, 
µ&RPSOLFLW\DQG&DXVDWLRQ¶Crim LR &.XW]µ&DXVHOHVV&RPSOLFLW\¶Criminal 
Law and Philosophy, 289±305.  
59 Williams, supra n 8. 
60 Kadish, supra n 61, at 354; Virgo, supra n 4, at 860. Support in case law: R. v A [2010] EWCA 
Crim 1622; R v Gnango [2011] UKSC 59, [52]±[55] and Wilcox v Jeffrey [2016] 2 WLR 681. 
61 Williams, supra n 8. 
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IV. Common Purpose: WWII case law 
 
In the aftermath of World War II, mid-level and lower Nazi defendants were 
tried by the Allied Powers before their own (military) courts sitting in the 
occupied zones in Germany. The courts relied on Control Council Law No 10 
(CCL10), drafted by the Allied Powers and based on the Statute of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, providing for a uniform basis of prosecution. The 
military courts interpreted the law in domestic terms.62 The relevant provision 
sates that any person is deemed to have committed a crime µ[i]f he was 
connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission¶ or µ[w]as a 
member of any organization or group connected with the commission of any 
such crime¶.63   
In Werner Rohde & Eight others,64 concentration camp staff members 
were charged with being concerned in the murder of four British women, 
liaison officers in France. None of the accused was charged with the actual 
killing. The Judge Advocate emphasised that: 
If two or more men set out on a murder and one stood half a mile away from where 
the actual murder was committed, perhaps to keep guard, although he was not 
actually present when the murder was done, if he was taking part with the other man 
with knowledge that that other man was going to put the killing into effect then he is 
just as guilty as the person who fired the shot or delivered the blow.65  
Important in this case is the insistence on equal guilt. The accused, who had 
not been present at the scene of the crimes were all convicted of murder 
because they knew of the crime. A strict mens rea outweighed a broad actus 
reus. Guilt was attributed to a wide range of different contributions to the 
crime. The same was done in the Max Wielen case where µFRQFHUQHG LQ WKH
NLOOLQJ¶ ranged from shooting prisoners, and acting as escorts, to holding off the 
public. 66  
                                                 
62 Reliance on this case law comes with a disclaimer: the cases are decided by (lay) military 
courts with advice from Advocate General; case law is not very sophisticated. Courts largely 
dispensed with specifying criminal conduct in any of the modes of liability nor did they 
distinguish clearly between principals and accessories. See A Von Knieriem, The Nuremberg 
Trials (Chicago, H. Regnery, 1959), 204±210. 
63 Art II(2) Control Council Law No 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes 
Against Peace and Against Humanity, December 20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council 
for Germany 50-55 (1946). 
64  British Military Court, Wuppertal, 29 May ± 1 June 1946, United Nations War Crimes 
Commission, Law Reports, Vol V, Case No 31 
65 Werner Rohde & Eight others, Vol V, at 56. 
66 Advocate-*HQHUDOµIf people are all present, aiding and abetting one another to carry out a 
crime they knew was going to be committed, they are taking their respective parts in carrying 
it out, whether it be to shoot or whether it is to keep off other people or act as an escort whilst 
these people were shot, they are all in law equally guilty of committing that offence, though 
WKHLULQGLYLGXDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\ZLWKUHJDUGWRSXQLVKPHQWPD\YDU\¶British Military Court, 1±
3 September 1947 (Hamburg), United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trial 
of War Criminals, Vol XI, 31±53, at 43±44. See also the Otto Sandrock et alµAlmelo FDVH¶
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In a number of cases, common purpose liability captured liability of 
what would normally be charged as instigation or abetting liability, ie 
accessorial liability before the fact. In the Adam Golkel-case, none of the 
defendants had taken direct part in the execution of British parachutists. They 
were, however, viewed as the ones setting the chain of events in motion and 
equally guilty to those executing the prisoners. 67 As LQ )RVWHU¶V H[DPSOH in 
English law, this type of common purpose-instigation carries a particular moral 
weight that justifies a conviction as principal.  
Common purpose liability in WWII cases was a useful prosecutorial 
tool; it captured a wide range of contributions to the criminal endeavour.68 This 
µIODWWHQLQJ¶RIFULPLQDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\ZDVW\SLFDOIRUWKHµFRQFHUQHGLQ¶-variant 
of joint enterprise and useful in dealing with collective violence. There was 
another µadvantage¶. In mob violence situations, overdetermined events where 
multiple causes had led to the commission of crimes, no exact identification of 
the causal contribution was required. At this point, we need to briefly discuss 
the Essen Lynching and Borkum Island cases, important precedents for JCE3 
in ICL. 
 In Essen Lynching, the case of the lynching of three British prisoners of 
war by German civilians, the German captain Erich Heyer had said loudly that 
the escorting soldiers should not interfere if German civilians would molest the 
prisoners; effectively encouraging the crowd to attack the prisoners. At trial, it 
was impossible to determine who had struck the fatal blow in each case. The 
Judge-Advocate stated:  
It was therefore, the submission of the Prosecution that every person who, following 
the incitement to the crowd to murder these men, voluntarily took aggressive action 
against anyone of these three airmen, was guilty in that he was concerned in the 
killing. It was impossible to separate anyone of these acts from another; they all 
made up what is known as a lynching.69 
The defendants were all convicted as principals in murder.70 Erich Heyer, who 
was considered the main villain, was sentenced to death while the others 
received prison sentences ranging from five years to life. All were equally guilty 
of murder but there was a different sentence depending on the role they had 
played in the killing. 
                                                 
British Military Court, 24±26 November 1945, United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law 
Reports Vol I, at 40 
67 Adam Golkel & Thirteen Others, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol III (London, 
+LV0DMHVW\¶V6WDWLRQDU\2IILFH±1949) Vol V, Case No 30, at 53. 
68  See E van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal responsibility in International Law, Oxford 
monographs in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) 30±36. 
69  British Military Court (Essen),18±22 December 1945, United Nations War Crimes 
Commission, Law Reports of Trial of War Criminals, Vol I, Case No 8, 88±92. 
70 Ibid at 91-2. 
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The Borkum Island case concerned the lynching of seven American 
airmen by German soldiers and civilians. 71 In convicting the defendants, no 
distinction was made between the mayor of the town, who had instigated the 
crowd but who had not participated in the killing, and the mob who had 
attacked the airmen. The mayor was found liable as principal perpetrator of 
murder 72 With regard to mens rea of the mayor the court found: 
All who join as participants in a plan to commit an unlawful act, the natural and 
foreseeable consequence of the execution, which involves the contingency of taking 
human life, are legally responsible as principals for a homicide committed by any of 
them in the furtherance of the plan [italics, EvS]. 
The Bokrum Island case is the only WWII precedent that provides for the 
natural and foreseeable consequences-test. Together with the Essen Lynching 
case, this ruling constitutes an important precedent for collateral joint criminal 
enterprise (JCE3) in ICL. 73  
 
V. Joint Enterprise Liability in ICL 
A. JCE 
 
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY read JCE into µFRPPLWWLQJ¶ in Article 7(1) of 
the ICTY Statute.74 Justifying this interpretation, the Chamber pointed to the 
object and purpose of the Statute and the collective nature of crimes committed 
in warlike situations.75 JCE, the Appeals Chamber held, was part of customary 
international law since it was relied upon in post-WWII case law. According to 
the Appeals Chamber in the case of Tadic, these cases proceed µupon the 
principle that when two or more persons act together to further a common 
                                                 
71 United States v Kurt Goebell et al. - Review and Recommendations of the Deputy Judge 
Advocate's Office, U.S. National Archives Microfilm Publications, I (available via ICC Legal 
Tools: www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/aeb036/). 
72  The court took into account other active conduct. The mayor had shRXWHG µEHDW WKH
PXUGHUHUV¶ DQG KDG IXUWKHUHG WKH SODQ µYHU\ DFWLYHO\¶ ZKLOH KH µH[HUWHG VWURQJ LQIOXHQFH LQ
LQFLWLQJWKHFLYLOLDQSRSXODWLRQWRDQJHUDJDLQVWWKHIOLHUV¶United States v Kurt Goebell et al. - 
Review and Recommendations of the Deputy Judge Advocate's Office, U.S. National Archives 
Microfilm Publications, I (available via ICC Legal Tools: www.legal-
tools.org/en/doc/aeb036/). at 37. 
73 Caution is, however, warranted. The natural and foreseeable consequence-reasoning was 
only applied to the mayor. There is little evidence in the Borkum Island case that an accused 
who had no intent to kill was found guilty of murder as a result of taking a foreseeable risk that 
murder would occur. See Powles, supra n 7, at 616. 
74  Tadic Appeals Judgment, supra n 13, paras 186±193. Art 7 (1): A person who planned, 
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or 
execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually 
responsible for the crime. 
75 µ>W@KHFULPHVDUHRIWHQFDUULHGRXWE\JURXSVRILQGLYLGXDOVDFWLQJLQSXUVXDQFHRIDFRPPRQ
criminal design...It follows that the moral gravity of such participation is often no less ± or 
indeed no different ± frRP WKDW RI WKRVH DFWXDOO\ FDUU\LQJ RXW WKH DFWV LQ TXHVWLRQ¶ Tadic 
Appeals Judgment, supra n 25, para 191.  
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criminal purpose, offences perpetrated by any of them may entail the criminal 
liability of all the members of the group¶.76 The Appeals Chamber held that 
equal guilt and a broad approach to the actus reus fits the collective nature of 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. 
In Tadic the Tribunal essentially distinguished two types of JCE: basic 
and extended JCE.77 In a basic JCE participants are liable for crimes that are 
within the scope of the common plan.78 Basic JCE is close to concepts of joint 
or co-perpetration in Romano-Germanic/civil law systems and µSODLQYDQLOOD¶
joint enterprise in English law where two people pursue a common criminal 
plan and commit a single crime. Extended JCE, or JCE3, concerns cases where 
one of the perpetrators commits an act which, while outside the common 
design, was nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of pursuing 
that common criminal design. 79  Initially, the ICTY used the term common 
purpose. Later, it adopted the term JCE to refer to 'collateral enterprises'80, 
which then  prevailed as the term to refer to all types of JCE.81 
 
B. JCE3 
 
The Tadic case is the leading case on JCE3.82 7DGLüZDVFKDUJHGZLWKFULPHV
against humanity and war crimes. One of the charges related to the killing of 
                                                 
76 Ibid, para 195. 
77 It actually distinguished three types of JCE: JCE1 (basic JCE), JCE2 (systemic JCE) and JCE3 
(extended JCE) but JCE2 has hardly been used and is not fundamentally different from JCE1 
since in both JCE1 and JCE2 crimes remain within the common purpose. The relevant 
paragraph in the 7DGLüAppeals Judgment SDUDUHDGV µ[t]he case law shows that the 
notion has been applied to three distinct categories of cases. First, in cases of co-perpetration, 
where all participants in the common design possess the same criminal intent to commit a 
crime (and one or more of them actually perpetrate the crime, with intent). Secondly, in the so-
cDOOHGµFRQFHQWUDWLRQFDPS¶FDVHVZKHUHWKHUHTXLVLWHPHQVUHDFRPSULVHVNQRZOHGJHRIWKH
nature of the system of ill-treatment and intent to further the common design of ill- treatment. 
Such intent may be proved either directly or as a matter of inference from the nature of the 
DFFXVHG¶V DXWKRULW\ ZLWKLQ WKH FDPS RU RUJDQLVDWLRQDO KLHUDUFK\ :LWK UHJDUG WR WKH WKLUG
FDWHJRU\RIFDVHV LW LVDSSURSULDWH WRDSSO\ WKHQRWLRQRI µFRPPRQSXUSRVH¶RQO\ZKHUHWKH
following requirements concerning mens rea are fulfilled: (i) the intention to take part in a joint 
criminal enterprise and to further ± individually and jointly ± the criminal purposes of that 
enterprise; and (ii) the foreseeability of the possible commission by other members of the group 
of offences thaWGRQRWFRQVWLWXWHWKHREMHFWRIWKHFRPPRQFULPLQDOSXUSRVH¶ 
78 Ibid, para 196. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend, 
3URVHFXWRUY5DGRVODY%UGDQLQ	0RPLU7DOLüCase No IT-99-36-PT, ICTY, T. Ch. II, 26 June 
2001, para 29. See also Prosecutor v Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, T.Ch., 25 March, para 78 
81  0LOXWLQRYLü HW DO (IT-05-87-37 'HFLVLRQ RQ 2GMDQLü 0RWLRQ &KDOOHQJLQJ -XULVGLFWLRQ
Indirect Co-Perpetration (0LOXWLQRYLüHWDO PT Decision on indirect co-perpetration), 22 March 
2006, para 36 
82 Early commentaries on this case, M Sassòli and LM Olsen, 'The Judgement of the ICTY 
$SSHDOV&KDPEHURQWKHPHULWVLQWKH7DGLüFDVH1HZKRUL]RQVIRULQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQLWDULDQ
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five men in the village of Jaskici. There was no evidence linking him directly to 
the killing; he was not present in the village. All the prosecutor could prove was 
that he was part of a group of armed men who were engaged in ethnically 
cleansing the Prejidor region and that he had previously taken part in the 
beating of men in a neighbouring village.83 7DGLü was charged with aiding and 
abetting crimes but found not guilty. On appeal the prosecutor changed tack 
and charged him under JCE. The Appeals Chamber IRXQG7DGLü guilty on the 
basis of JCE3 liability. The court relied on the mob violence cases discussed 
above: Essen Lynching and Borkum Island. The deaths in Jaskici were 
considered natural and foreseeable consequences of the common purpose to 
ethnically cleanse Prijidor.84 With regard to the mens rea the Appeals Chamber 
found: 
Hence, the participants must have had in mind the intent, for instance, to ill-treat 
prisoners of war (even if such a plan arose extemporaneously) and one or some 
members of the group must have actually killed them. «What is required is a state 
of mind in which a person, although he did not intend to bring about a certain result, 
was aware that the actions of the group were most likely to lead to that result but 
nevertheless willingly took that risk. In other words, the so-called dolus eventualis is 
required.85  
In finding 7DGLüguilty the Appeals Chamber read the Essen Lynching case as 
employing a foresight-test. Those who simply struck a blow or incited the 
murder, µcould have foreseen that others would kill the prisoners; hence they 
were found guilty of murder¶.86 However, there is no mention of foresight in 
the Essen Lynching case. The latter is an overdetermined event-case. By not 
requiring identification of individual contributions to the crime, leaving 
undefined who gave the final blow, it enabled a pronouncement of equal guilt 
for all those participating in the lynching. The foresight-test can, however,be 
traced back to the Borkum Island case. Yet in that case it had a more limited 
reach since it was only applied to the mayor who was present at the scene of the 
crime and egged on the mob. The legal basis of JCE3 in WWII case law is weak 
to say the least.  
 7DGLü had not instigated those who killed the men in the village of 
Jaskici. Nor had he been present at the scene of the crimes. He was liable for 
the killings because he was a member of a group that had actively taken part in 
an ethnic cleansing campaign during which inhumane acts such as severe 
beatings frequently occurred.87 It is telling that the Appeals Chamber referred 
WRµ3LQNHUWRQFRQVSLUDF\¶WRVXEVWDQWLDWHWKDW-&(KDVequivalents in domestic 
                                                 
and criminal law?', 82 IRRC (2000), at 733±769; M Sassòli and LM Olsen, 
3URVHFXWRUY7DGLü 
(Judgement)', 94 AJIL (2000), 57 et seq. 
83 Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, paras 369±388. 
84 7DGLüAppeals Judgment, supra n 25, paras 232±33. 
85  Ibid, para 220. As an aside we should note that the conflation of dolus eventualis and 
recklessness is inappropriate. Recklessness does not contain a volitional element (accepting a 
risk) while dolus eventualis does, making dolus eventualis a form of intent. 
86 Tadic Appeals Chamber, supra n 25, para 209. 
87 Ibid, para 232. 
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jurisdictions. Pinkerton conspiracy is developed by US federal courts, making 
each member of a conspiracy liable for substantive offences carried out by co-
conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, even when there is no evidence 
of their direct participation in, or positive knowledge of such offences. 88 
3LQNHUWRQFRQVSLUDFLHVH[WHQGOLDELOLW\WRRIIHQFHVWKDWDUHµUHDVRQDEO\IRUHVHHQ
DVDQHFHVVDU\RUQDWXUDOFRQVHTXHQFHRIWKHXQODZIXODJUHHPHQW¶89 JCE3 in 
7DGLü is less akin to abetting/instigation liability - ie classic complicity - than 
the common purpose concept in WWII case law. On the other hand, ICTY 
judges have referred to it as a form of complicity liability, different from aiding 
and abetting yet complying with the traditional derivative structure of 
complicity.90  
The foresight-test of JCE3 is stricter than foresight in PAL. It must be 
established that D2 intended the original crime A and that the collateral crime 
B is a natural and foreseeable consequence of the JCE (objective test). The 
accused must have realised that the collateral crime was a possible 
consequence of the common purpose (subjective test). Here a sufficiently 
substantial risk that the crime may be committed is sufficient. 91 7DGLü KDG
participated in the rounding up of men and beating them.92 In the course of the 
ethnic cleansing, killings frequently occurred. He had been aware of those 
SUHYLRXV NLOOLQJV 7KH ULVN WKDW SHRSOH LQ -DVNLüL ZRXOG EH NLOOHG ZDV
foreseeable, a risk 7DGLü accepted or at least was indifferent to, which can be 
inferred from the fact that he continued to engage with the group and support 
ethnically 'cleansing' the area. Acceptance of the risk is a volitional element, 
which makes it more stringent than the PAL foresight-test, which is purely 
FRJQLWLYH 7KH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V UHTXLUHPHQW LQ Jogee RI µDVVHQW¶ WR WKH
expanded scope of the criminal objective (crime B) seems to similarly require 
volition.93 Krebs has argued in favour of such a test in English law when she 
suggested PAL require proof of endorsement with regard to the collateral 
offence.94  
Foresight in ICL is dolus eventualis, the lowest degree of intent. In 
general, common purpose and joint enterprise in ICL come with a broad 
approach to actus reus, which, at least in the early cases, is offset by mens rea. 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 Pinkerton v U.S., 328 US 640 (1946). 
89 Ibid, see dictum. 
90 The Tadic $SSHDOV &KDPEHU UHIHUUHG WR FRPPRQ SXUSRVH-&( DV µD IRUP RI DFFRPSOLFH
OLDELOLW\¶3URVHFXWRUY7DGLüJudgment, Case No IT-94-1-A, ICTY, A. Ch., July 15, 1999, para 
101. Confusingly it also refers to participants in a JCE as 'co-perpetrators' or 'joint principals'. 
Seeinfra, under section (D). 
91 Yanev, see supra n 27, 238±239 
92 Tadic Appeal judgment, supra n 25, paras 230±33 
93 R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, [78]. 
94 Krebs, supra n 6. 
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C. µ-XVW&RQYLFW(YHU\RQH¶ 
 
Over the years, JCE transformed and expanded. In 7DGLü joint enterprise 
liability was applied to small-scale, mob violence situations with a 
circumscribed common purpose. JCE beyond 7DGLü, however, was applied to 
large enterprises establishing liability of senior military and political leaders. 
Prominent examples are the cases of, Krajisnik 95 , Brdnin 96 , 0DUWLü 97  and 
6DLQRYLü et al.98 Common plans or objectives have a vast scope in temporal and 
geographical terms and are formulated at aggregate level, as deportation, 
persecution, forcible transfer or even the aim to modify the ethnic balance of 
Kosovo.99 The plan and its objectives are achieved through the commission of 
multiple crimes such as murder, torture and rape.100  
The structure of this type of JCE-liability with criminal objectives 
formulated by senior military and political figures at meta-level and crimes 
carried out by perpetrators on the ground (referred to as relevant physical 
perpetrators (RPP)) with no common purpose that connects the two levels, 
generated a theory of liability which can be termed as leadership JCE or vertical 
JCE (opposed to horizontal 7DGLü-type JCE). Crimes committed by those on 
the ground were imputed to those in leadership positions who were far 
removed from the physical perpetrators.  
The leading case that endorsed leadership JCE is the %UÿQLQ case.101 Its 
key finding is that the principal perpetrator does not have to be a member of 
the JCE and that no proof of an agreement is required between those in 
leadership positions and the principal perpetrators. The Appeals Chamber held 
WKDW µ>Z@KDW PDWWHUV LV«ZKHWKHU WKH FULPH LQ TXHVWLRQ IRUPV SDUW RI WKH
FRPPRQ SXUSRVH¶102  To hold a member of the JCE responsible for crimes 
perpetrated by a non-member, it was sufficient to show that at least one 
member of the JCE could be linked to a non-member. When the latter is used 
by the former as a tool to carry out the common criminal purpose, the other 
participants of the JCE are equally liable for the crimes.103 Proof of intention in 
                                                 
95 Prosecutor v Krajisnik, Case No IT-00-39-A, ICTY, A. Ch., 17 March 2009. 
96 %UÿDQLQAppeal Judgment, see supra n 83. 
97 3URVHFXWRUY0DUWLü, Case No IT-95-11-A, ICTY, A.Ch., 8 October 2008. 
98  6DLQRYLü HW DO Trial Judgment, 26 February 2009. This case was formerly known as 
0LOXWLQRYLüHWDO0LOXWLQRYLüZDVDFTXLWWHG&DVH1R,7-05-87-T, 26 February 2009. 
99 Amended Joinder Indictment, Prosecutor v 0LOXWLQRYLüHWDO6DLQRYLüHWDO, Case Nos. IT-
03-70-PT and IT-99-37-PT, 16 August 2005, para 19; Separate Opinion of Judge David Hunt 
on Challenge by Ojdanic to Jurisdiction Joint Criminal Enterprise, Milutonovic. et al. (IT-99-
37-AR72), 21 May 2003, para 31. 
100 Judgement, 3URVHFXWRUY.YRþNDHWDO Cases No IT-98-30/1-A, ICTY, A. Ch., 25 February 
2008, paras 319±320. 
101  Prosecutor v %UÿQLQ, Case No IT-99-36-A, ICTY, A. Ch., 3 April 2007 (%UÿQLQ Appeal 
-XGJPHQW)RUDFRPPHQWDU\VHH&)DUKDQJµ3RLQWRIQRUHWXUQ-RLQW&ULPLQDO(QWHUSULVHLQ
%UÿQLQ¶, (2010) LJIL, 137±164.  
102 %UÿQLQ Appeal Judgement, para 410. 
103 Ibid, para 413. 
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these leadership JCEs is inferred from presence at meetings where the common 
purpose is discussed and agreed upon. For instance, in %UÿQLQ the 
establishment of a separate Serbian state was planned by way of detaining non-
Serbs in camps to create a corridor to link Serb territories.104 The ICTY found 
that torture and unlawful killing in the camps was an integral part of 
implementing the strategy agreed upon at leadership level and hence could be 
imputed to %UÿQLQ despite the fact that there was no proof of an agreement with 
the physical perpetrators.105 A leadership JCE is very similar to Pinkerton-type 
conspiracies in that in essence it constitutes (choate) conspiracy liability; 
conspirators are liable for the crimes they plotted. 
To date, JCE has a controversial reputation, particularly JCE3. JCE is 
jokingly referred to as the acronym for Just Convict Everyone. Basic JCE, or 
JCE1, where crimes remain within the scope of the purpose is uncontroversial 
and has been accepted as a form of joint perpetration. JCE3, however, has 
sparked debate amongst practitioners and legal commentators. Its legal basis 
in WWII case law is weak and, more importantly, there is a lack of 
differentiation in the moral position of those who intend and those who merely 
have foresight. Participants in a JCE, because JCE is a form of committing, are 
regarded as perpetrators who are more deserving of punishment than aiders 
and abettors (see further below, under subsection D).106 This is problematic 
since JCE3, like aiding and abetting, generates liability that is not on the same 
par as participation in a JCE with (full) intent. It connotes a different moral 
position.107 As Ohlin observes: µthe most basic problem with the doctrine of 
MRLQWFULPLQDOHQWHUSULVH¶LVµLWVLPSRVLWLRQRIHTXDOFXOSDELOLW\IRUDOOPHPEHUV
RIDMRLQWHQWHUSULVH¶108  
The controversy over JCE, in particular JCE3, has led some courts to 
reject it (Cambodia Tribunal,109 ICC110) or limit its application.111  
                                                 
104 Prosecutor v %UÿQLQ, Case No IT-99-36-T, ICTY, T. Ch., 1 September 2004 (%UÿQLQTrial 
Judgment), para 118. 
105  6XFK DV XVLQJ µXQFRQWUROOHG¶ SROLFH DQG XQLWV WKDW UDQ GHWHQWLRQ FDPSV DQG FRPPLWWHG
crimes against civilians detained in those camps, %UÿQLQTrial Judgment, para 119.   
106 Van Sliedregt, supra n 5, 189±190.  
107 -XGJH/HDUQHG+DQG¶VGHVFULSWLRQRI LQWHQWLRQDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIKDYLQJ µD VWDNH LQ LW¶ RU
GLVSOD\LQJ D µSXUSRVLYH DWWLWXGH¶ PDUNV WKH GLIIHUHQFH ZLWK NQRZLQJ SDUWLFLSDWLRQ United 
States v Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (1938). See also Kutz, supra n 61, at 162. 
108 Ohlin, supra n 7, at 85. See also G Boas et al. International Criminal Law Practitioner, Vol 
I, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 65±66. 
109  Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), Supreme Court Chamber 
Judgment Appeal, Prosecutor v Nuon Chea and Khieu Sampan, Judgment, No 002/19-09-
2007-ECCC/SC, 23 November 2016. 
110 The ICC Statute does not provide for it because of its strict mens rea element in art 30. See 
text accompanying n 26.  
111 The UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon does not regard it applicable with regard to special 
intent crimes such as terrorism: Interlocutory Decision on the applicable law: terrorism, 
conspiracy, homicide, perpetration, cumulative charging, Case No STL-11-01/I, A. Ch., 16 
February 2011, paras 248±249. 
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D. Nature  
 
From its inception, JCE was distinguished from aiding and abetting.112  For 
joint enterprise there is a less stringent contribution element and hence a 
looser causal requirement: acts performed by the participant should µin some 
way¶ further the common purpose.113 For aiding and abetting liability, proof is 
required of a µsubstantial effect¶ on the perpetration of the crime.114 The Appeals 
Chamber in %UÿDQLQ somewhat qualified the contribution to a JCE by requiring 
µa significant contribution to the crimes¶, probably anticipating critique of its 
broadening of the law on JCE in others respects.115 In practice it is not clear 
ZKDW WKHPHDQLQJRI µVLJQLILFDQW¶ LVDQGKRZ LWGLIIHUV IURPµVXEVWDQWLDO¶ WKH
standard for aiding and abetting. For aiding and abetting liability, the requisite 
mental element is knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor 
assist the commission of a specific crime by the principal. For JCE it suffices to 
prove that the defendant either had intent to pursue the common criminal 
design or that he had foresight that crime(s) might be committed.  
The Appeals Chamber distinguished JCE from aiding and abetting yet 
in another way. It found that where people participated in a JCE, to convict 
them µ[o]nly as an aider and abettor might understate the degree of their 
criminal responsibility¶.116 Participants in a JCE are regarded on the same par 
as principal perpetrators. In fact, they can be more culpable than principal 
perpetrators when they occupy senior positions and plotted the crimes that are 
then committed by principals.117 This does not comport with the principles 
underlying (classic) cause-based complicity liability which is derivative. 
Indeed, the nature of JCE liability is unclear. It can be best described as 
a hybrid of perpetration and complicity liability. It is liability for crimes 
committed by another person (the physical principal) with whom there is some 
form of association via assistance or encouragement. This is a typical feature of 
common law complicity and an indication that liability is derivative. At the 
same time, JCE has evolved into a concept with a remote link to physical 
perpetrators. The ICTY Appeals Chamber uses the terms µSHUSHWUDWRU¶ DQGµFR-
perpetrDWRU¶WRUHIHUWRDll participants in a JCE, also the remote ones. They are 
not secondary parties or accomplices; they are regarded as liable in their own 
right, as if they had committed the crime they are held liable for.118 Leadership 
JCEs are agency-based, conspiracy-like constructions rather than liability akin 
to (cause-based) complicity. 
                                                 
112 Tadic Appeal judgment, supra n 25, para 229. See also N Jain, supra n 24, at 32. 
113 Tadic Appeal judgment, supra n 25, para 229. 
114 Ibid. 
115 %UÿDQLQAppeal Judgment, see supra n 83, para. 430. 
116 7DGLüAppeal Judgement, supra n 25, para 192.  
117 6HHHPSLULFDOUHVHDUFKE\+ROD%+RODHWDOµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO6HQWHQFLQJ)DFWVDQG)LJXUHV
6HQWHQFLQJ3UDFWLFHDWWKH,&7<DQG,&75¶ (2011) JICJ at 417; %+RODHWDOµ,V,&7<6HQWHQFLQJ
SUHGLFWDEOH"$Q(PSLULFDO$QDO\VLVRI,&7<6HQWHQFLQJ3UDFWLFH¶LJIL 79±97. 
118 Tadic Appeal Judgment, supra n 25, para 192. 
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VI. Interim Conclusion 
 
A brief summing-up of joint enterprise in English law and ICL is warranted.  
 
A. Non-collateral common purpose  
 
Nowadays, in English law, common purpose is subsumed under 
complicity/aiding and abetting liability since the latter has broadened by no 
longer requiring tangible contributions to the crime. In ICL, common purpose 
is distinct from complicity liability. The central tenet of liability is the common 
criminal purpose, which offsets the broad actus reus and essentially captures 
any contribution to the criminal endeavour. Common purpose in ICL has two 
main purposes: (i) to overcome causality problems for overdetermined events, 
and (ii) to provide for equal guilt of those engaged in pursuing a criminal 
purpose and ± especially in leadership JCEs ± to express a perpetrator-like 
status of those who mastermind crimes. Equal guilt does not mean equal 
punishment. Role-variance can still be reflected in the sentence. Hence the 
different sentences that were imposed by military tribunals to participants 
found equally guilty for pursuing a common design or purpose.. 
 
B. Collateral Liability 
 
PAL and JCE3 have the propensity to expand. Illustrative in ICL is the 
transformation of joint enterprise from small scale mob violence-JCE to 
leadership JCE. For PAL, the 'wider principle' of Chan Wing Siu opened the 
door to expansive forms of collateral liability. In Jogee, PAL was reigned in to 
the extent that it now aligns to aiding and abetting-liability, requiring proof of 
intent rather than foresight. JCE3 still generates collateral liability based on a 
foresight-test. This is, however, more stringent than foresight in PAL since it 
comes with a voluntary element; acceptance of a risk one foresees.   
 
C. Nature 
 
While in their origin cause-based liability, PAL and JCE3, as (expansive forms 
of) collateral liability, identify more with agency-based complicity. Neither is 
anchored in a clear theoretical basis. This causes them to drift and  - in the 
words of Krebs - to IXQFWLRQ DV DQ µLQWHUORSHU¶ µ[u]ndermining the more 
rigorous mens rea requirements of aiding and abetting¶.119 While PAL is back 
into the complicity fold, JCE3 remains distinct. It constitutes 
(quasi)perpetration rather than secondary liability/complicity. 
Summarising: 
                                                 
119 Krebs (2010), supra n 6, at 588. 
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± 3$/ DQG -&( FDQ EH WUDFHG EDFN WR µFROODWHUDO common purpose¶ LQ
)RVWHU¶V &URZQ ODZ and WWII case law, respectively, criminalising 
setting a chain of events into motion with foresight of further crimes; 
± Common purpose/joint enterprise in ICL, despite generating equal 
guilt, allows for differentiation in sentencing; 
± JCE3 in ICL is PRUHµEDODQFHd¶ than PAL in English law: it employs a 
broad actus reus but the mens rea contains a voluntary element, which 
makes it more stringent than foresight in English law. It is a form of 
intent in Roman-Germanic systems (dolus eventualis); 
± Joint enterprise liability in ICL has developed into a sui generis form of 
complicity. In its expansive leadership modality, it identifies as a type of 
(non-physical) perpetration rather than liability that derives from the 
principal (D1).  
 
STEP II: Determining its Merit  
 
VII. Inchoate Complicity 
 
With leadership JCEs but also with certain cases of PAL, it is difficult to sustain 
that it is cause-based liability. The link to the crime via an identifiable act 
contributing towards causing the crime is weak. At this point we should discuss 
&KULVWRSKHU.XW]¶ZRUNRQFRPSOLFLW\ 
Kutz offers an alternative to a cause-based theory of complicity.120 He 
argues that the conduct component of complicity is not easily understood in 
terms of causal difference-making. Complicity liability in his view is 
fundamentally premised on the sharing of intent with the principal, what he 
FDOOV µSDUWLFLSDWRU\ LQWHQW¶121 He suggests reform of complicity by moving it 
toward an inchoate theory of liability, which predicates liability on the attempt 
to aid and abet.122 Drawing on the US Model Penal Code, he suggests that 
liability should rest on vaguer grounds than interpersonal causation,  
[s]uch as whether a given defendant has manifested some form of social 
dangerousness, independent of the causal efficacy of the particular role he played.123  
Causation still is a factor in determining liability. While the accomplice's act 
must be of the sort that could have made a difference to the principal's crime, 
it need not be shown to have actually made a difference. This non-cause based, 
inchoate complicity theory fits overdetermined events where a single-observed 
effect is determined by multiple causes, which is the reality of collective 
                                                 
120 Kutz, supra n 61. 
121 C Kutz, Complicity. Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) 66±112. 
122 Kutz, supra n 61, at 164. 
123 Kutz, supra n 61, at 150. 
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violence and mass atrocities. 124  Another µDGYDQWDJH¶ of a non-cause-based 
theory, also flagged up by Kutz, is that it no longer adheres to a derivative 
structure, allowing for liability of instigator D2 to be greater than that of D1. 
This is certainly appropriate for ICL where those who mastermind crimes, and 
rarely have blood on their hands, are the real villain. They can be punished as 
the intellectual perpetrator, the auctor intellectualis. 
Leadership JCEs neatly fit Kutz' theory of inchoate complicity. There is 
a remote link in place and time between those in leadership positions and those 
physically committing crimes, which makes case-based attribution of liability 
difficult. Instead, liability is premised on the agreement of those in leadership 
positions. As long as the crimes committed by physical perpetrators are within 
the scope of this agreement they can be imputed to remote 
participants/perpetrators in leadership positions. Punishment is based on the 
crimes committed by physical perpetrators with whom there is a weak link. It 
is, therefore, essential that the crimes committed are within the common 
purpose. Only then is punishment justifiable. This requires the common plan 
or agreement to be specific, avoiding ex-post fact imputation of crimes that are 
presumed to be part of a plan.  
Against that background, it is highly problematic that the Appeals 
Chamber in %UDÿQLQ accepted the JCE3 format for leadership JCEs; ie liability 
for crimes that lie outside the common purpose.125 The pertinent issue, which 
so far has not been clarified, is whether all participants in a JCE can be liable 
for crimes that lie outside the scope of the common plan but that were foreseen 
by one co-participant? In other words, can the mens rea of the member-
participant who uses the non-member participant, replace the mens rea of all 
the participants? If so, this would make JCE a type of vicarious liability.  
When we apply Kutz¶ inchoate complicity theory to leadership JCEs we 
uncover the problematic structure of non-cause based collateral liability such 
as leadership JCEs.  While this type of collateral modality can be relaxed in 
terms of causation, its agency-nature requires more stringent terms with 
regard to the scope of the common purpose. In principle, there is no liability 
for crimes that exceed the common purpose.  
 
VIII. Merits of Joint Enterprise  
 
In its original form, as common purpose liability that captures intangible 
contributions before or during the commission of the crime, joint enterprise, is 
                                                 
124 Kutz, supra n 68, at 160. See for an analysis on causation and mass atrocities: JG Stewart, 
µ2YHUGHWHUPLQHG$WURFLWLHV¶JICJ 1189±1218. 
125 The Chamber held that as long as it can be shown that the member who uses non-members 
as tools to carry out the actus reus had the requisite intent, ie that in the circumstances of the 
case (i) it was foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by one or more of the 
principal persons and that (ii) he willingly took that risk, all can be held equally liable of that 
crime. Brdanin Appeal judgment, supra n 83, para 411. 
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cause-based. Its requirements, however, are less burdensome; it has long 
functioned DVµFRPSOLFLW\OLJKW¶. Pursuing a common criminal purpose is much 
more vague and indeterminate than requiring a particular act of assistance or 
encouragement to a particular individual with regard to a particular crime. The 
contribution and link to the crime can remain under the cover of pursuing a 
common criminal purpose. Over the years ± and this is certainly true for 
English law± the µFRPSOLFLW\ OLJKW¶-role of joint enterprise has become less 
obvious. Joint enterprise developed into expansive, sui generis liability. 
Moreover, with the reigning in of PAL, the UKSC has ended common 
purpose/joint enterprise altogether.  
 I believe there is a role for joint enterprise liability still. At least three 
reasons can be mentioned; all three emerged from discussing Kutz' theory of 
inchoate complicity. When we accept a non-cause based theory of inchoate 
complicity there is room for accepting liability theories that capture liability for 
organized and collective forms of violence without abandoning fundamental 
principles of criminal responsibility. 
First of all, joint enterprise has the capacity to capture the liability of 
remote participants for overdetermined events. Since liability is not cause-
based, joint enterprise can capture  liability for group or mob violence events 
where the link to the crime cannot be identified and can stay under the cover 
of 'participating in a common criminal purpose'. Liability is premised on 
participatory inten; on pursuing a common criminal aim. Secondly, as 
collateral liability based on a foresight test, joint enterprise captures conduct 
that cannot be successfully prosecuted under complicity with its more stringent 
mens rea.126 This does, however, require setting a limit preventing liability to 
over-extend (see section IX below). Thirdly, and this is particularly relevant for 
ICL, joint enterprise, because of its non-derivative, agency nature, coupled with 
the broad actus reus terminology allows for framing the liability of the auctor 
intellectualis. With common purpose liability, the distinction between 
principals and accessories is immaterial; the persons involved are all referred 
WRDVµSDUWLHVWRDMRLQWHQWHUSULVH¶RUµMRLQWSULQFLSDOV¶127 Those who instigate 
others to commit crimes are not accessories but participants whose guilt is 
equal or more serious than that of the physical perpetrator. Joint enterprise 
allows for the structure of remote principals who control physical perpetrators, 
using them as tools, to commit crimes.128 Senior defendants in a leadership JCE 
are auctor intellectualis, intellectual perpetrators. This comports with a broad 
understanding of perpetration in most civil law jurisdictions. In these 
                                                 
126 For a classic piece on the distinction between the mental element of complicity and joint 
enterprise, see Simester, supra n 6.  
127 R v Salmon (1880) 6 QBD 79; R v Williams and Davies, 95 Cr App R 1, CA.  
128 7KLVSULQFLSOHLVEURDGHUWKDQLQQRFHQWDJHQF\ZKHUHWKHGLUHFWSHUSHWUDWRULV µLQQRFHQW¶
See C. Roxin, Straftaten im Rahmen organisDWRULVFKHU0DFKWVDSSDUDWH¶*ROWGDPPHU¶V$UFKLY
für Strafrecht (GA) (1963) for a translation: C Roxin, Crimes as Part of Organized Power 
Structures, 9 JICJ (2011), 193±205. See further S Roxin, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft, 
(Berlin, De Gruyter, 2006), 242±252, 704±717. 
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jurisdictions, the concept of principal liability is a normative concept. 129  It 
DWWDFKHV WR WKH SHUVRQ ZKR LV µPRVW UHVSRQVLEOH¶ not just the person who 
physically commits the crime. The normative approach to perpetration is 
attractive from a fair labelling point of view and has appeal in ICL where so 
often those behind the scene of the crimes, with no blood on their hands, are 
the real villains. 
As always with comparative legal analysis, one has to be mindful of the 
context within which one discusses legal concepts. It is as much the societal 
context and legal landscape that accounts for the development of a legal 
concept as the legal precedents on which it is based. The fact that conspiracy 
does not feature as a general theory of liability in ICL partially explains why 
JCE developed into a conspiracy-type concept. Also, international courts have 
a specific mandate to prosecute and try senior defendants. Often the actual 
perpetrators are unknown and still at large.  
 
STEP III: Redrawing boundaries 
 
IX. Reappraising the Foresight-test 
 
What have we learnt from this analysis and comparison of joint enterprise in 
English law and ICL? First of all, that there is not one concept of common 
purpose or joint enterprise liability. It is helpful to think of joint enterprise 
liability as a spectre with at one end the agency pole and at the other end the 
causation pole. PAL and leadership JCE are close to the agency-end of the 
spectre. Common purpose and concerned in-liability can be positioned towards 
the cause-based liability-end of the spectre. JCE3 Tadic-style will be 
somewhere in the middle.  
With PAL aligned to complicity post-Jogee and JCE3 in ICL increasingly 
viewed with circumspection,130 the question arises how to value collateral joint 
enterprise based on a foresight-test. Australia and Hong Kong still provide for 
it as do the statutes of some international courts (amongst which the ICTY). Is 
this concept fundamentally flawed, ie inherently violating the principle of 
personal culpability? Quite apart from the question whether the law provides 
for PAL or JCE3 ± this is contested ± there is a legal-theoretical and policy 
debate to be had. This requires discussing joint enterprise and common 
purpose, once again, in their different modalities, as cause-based liability and 
as agency-liability, and to set out the wrongs they seek to address. 
                                                 
129  7KLV DQDO\VLV GUDZV SDUWO\ RQ 9RJHO¶V SDSHU ZKR GLVWLQJXLVKHV WZHOYH PRGHOV - 9RJHO
µ,QGLYLGXHOOH YHUDQWZRUWOLFKNHLW LP 9|ONHUVWUDIUHFKW¶   Zeischrift für die gesamte 
Strafrechtswissenschaft 403±436. For an English version: J VRJHO µ+RZ WR GHWHUPLQH
LQGLYLGXDOFULPLQDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\ LQV\VWHPDWLFFRQWH[WV7ZHOYH0RGHOV¶ Cahiers de 
Défense Sociale 151±169. 
130 See text accompanying n 107 and further. 
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Like classic complicity, cause-based joint enterprise liability seeks to 
address the setting into motion of events that lead to the commission of a crime. 
Rather than criminalising distinct acts of encouragement or assistance, joint 
enterprise criminalises encouraging or assisting by way of pursuing a common 
purpose. As cause-based liability, there is a causal connection to the crime. This 
does not mean that liability cannot be collateral. We are reminded of the 
variation rule discussed by Foster, which is an early precedent of collateral 
common purpose (PAL). The WWII cases are also illustrative of collateral, 
cause-based common design/purpose liability. In the cases against Erich Heyer 
and Adam Golkel the wrong was found in setting into motion a chain of events 
leading to crimes.  
The fact that common purpose is cause-based means that there is an 
inherent limit to collateral liability. Causation requires proximity. Consider the 
8.6&¶V UXOLQJ LQ Jogee where it held that remoteness can break the causal 
chain.  
>L@WLVDTXHVWLRQRIIDFWDQGGHJUHHZKHWKHU'¶VFRQGXFWZDVVRGLVWDQFHGLQWLPH
place or circumstances from the conduct of D1 that it would not be realistic to regard 
'¶VRIIHQFHDVHQFRXUDJHGRUDVVLVWHGE\LW131 
An analogy with instigation liability is helpful to understand the different ways 
in which causation may limit attribution of liability for collateral crimes. In 
German law the limit is drawn by way of an objective (causation) test. Roxin 
argues that when a statement cannot objectively be seen to provoke a certain 
event or act, it should not be considered an act of criminal participation by 
µAnstiftung¶ (instigation)7KLVUHVRQDWHVLQ.UHEV¶VXJJHVWLRQWRYLHZ3$/DVa 
principle of exculpation rather than a theory of liability. It sets limits to liability 
for excess crimes. 132 Dutch law adopts a different approach; it sets a limit via 
mens rea where the acceptance of risk plays an important role in determining 
liability. A dolus eventualis test applies in cases of co-perpetration and 
instigation ZKLFK µDEVRUEs¶ H[FHVV/collateral crimes. Proof is required of an 
awareness and acceptance of a risk (objective test) on the part of D2 that crime 
B might materialise. 133  Here it is presumed crime B was part of the order. Also 
                                                 
131 R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, [12]. 
132  Krebs (2010), supra n 6, at 579. She EDVHV WKLV RQ 6WHSKHQ¶V FRPPHQWDU\ $UWLFOH 

FRPPRQSXUSRVH
RIKLV'LJHVWRIWKH&ULPLQDO/DZUHDGVµ:KHQVHYHUDOSHUVRQVWDNHSDUW
in the execution of a common criminal each is a principal in the second degree, in respect of 
every crime any one of them in the execution of that purpose. If any of the offenders commits 
a crime foreign to the common criminal purpose, the others are neither principals in the second 
GHJUHHQRUDFFHVVRULHVXQOHVVWKH\DFWXDOO\LQVWLJDWHRUDVVLVWLQWKHFRPPLVVLRQ¶ 
133 This is the acceptable standard in The Netherlands and Germany. For Germany, Roxin 
argues that when a statement cannot objectively be seen to provoke a certain event or act, it 
VKRXOGQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGDQDFWRIFULPLQDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQE\µ$QVWLIWXQJ¶LQVWLJation), C Roxin 
in: H-H Jescheck and W Ruß (eds), Strafgesetzbuch: Leipziger Kommentar § 26 StGB (Berlin, 
De Gruyter, 1993). In the Netherlands dolus eventualis is an accepted fault degree for 
instigation/ordering. See HGM Krabbe, 'Uitlokking', in J L van der Neut (ed), Daderschap en 
Deelneming (Deventer, Gouda Quint, 1999) 127±147. See also Dutch Supreme Court, 12 
October 1982, NJ 1983, 799; Dutch Supreme Court, 29 April 1997, NJ 1997, 654. 
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in ICL, a dolus eventualis test applies for ordering crimes, a specific form of 
instigation liability. %ODãNLüZDVKHOGOLDEOHIRUFULPHVKHKDGQRWRUGHUHGEXW 
nevertheless had accepted as likely consequences.134 The court ruled that by 
ordering an attack on villages in an atmosphere of ethnic tension, he increased 
the chance of a massacre and hence accepted the crimes that ensued from the 
attack. They were part of the crimes he ordered and he was hence criminally 
liable for. JCE3 with its natural and foreseeable consequences-reasoning 
adopts a similar test and is therefore not an outlier when it comes to accepting 
(cause-based) collateral liability. In fact, it can be argued that JCE3, with its 
dolus eventualis test of acceptance of a risk that a crime might materialise, is 
liability for crimes that can be presumed to have been within the plan: not as 
desired but as incidental.  
Does this mean that a voluntary element-mens rea (ie dolus eventualis 
at the least) justifies the attribution of collateral joint enterprise? My answer 
would be, no not in every case. When it concerns non-cause based joint 
enterprise, more is needed. Leadership JCEs and PAL are premised on a very 
weak link to the crime. They are not cause-based. It is rather the association 
with the perpetrator/principal (D1) and authorising him/her to commit crime 
A, which makes D2 liable for crime B. Liability is agency-based. Collateral 
liability should not be accepted and established the same way as for cause-
based joint enterprise. To compensate for a tenuous link to crime A, the 
subjective element should be bolstered. Liability of D2 for crime B should 
require proof that crime B was within the common plan, desired and not 
incidental, ie agreed upon by both D1 and D2. Under such circumstances 
foresight should not suffice as the fault degree. In other words, bearing in mind 
.XW]¶WKHRU\RILQFKRDWHFRPSOLFLW\Where should not be collateral liability for 
non-cause based joint enterprises. 
Another way of restricting expansive notions of collateral liability is via 
the actus reus. In R v Macklin 135  proof was required of a separate act of 
encouragement or assistance for crimes that go beyond the common 
agreement.136 There is a two-step phase: phase 1 where D1 and D2 agree on 
crime A and where D2 does not perform any further act of encouragement or 
assistance; phase 2 where D1 commits the collateral/incidental crime B for 
which D2 is only liable when he encourages or assists crime B. This is 
essentially insisting on a cause-based type of liability. In Brdanin, a similar 
attempt was made; by imposing additional actus reus conditions the ICTY 
attempted to reign in JCE. Participants in a leadership JCE must have made a 
                                                 
134 µ$SHUVRQZKRRUGHUVDQDFWRURPLVVLRQZLWKWKHDwareness of the substantial likelihood 
that a crime will be committed in the execution of that order, has the requisite mens rea for 
establishing liability under article 7(1) pursuant to ordering. Ordering with such awareness has 
to be regarded as acceptinJWKDWFULPH¶3URVHFXWRUY%ODãNLü, Case No IT-95-14-A, 29 July 2004, 
para 42. 
135 R v Macklin (1838) 2 Lewin 225; 168 ER 1136. 
136 Sjölin, supra n 4, at 133. 
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µVXEVWDQWLDOFRQWULEXWLRQ¶to the crimes for which they are to be found liable.137 
6RIDUQRRQHUHDOO\NQRZVZKDWµVXEVWDQWLDO¶PHDQVDQGKRZLWGLIIHUVIURPD
µVLJQLILFDQWFRQWULEXWLRQ¶ZKLFKLVUHTXLUHGIRUDLGLQJDQGDEHWWLQJ It seems to 
have been a gesture reassuring those critical of JCE. 
-RLQWHQWHUSULVH¶VGHPHULWLVQRWQHFHVVDULO\IRUHVLJKW$VORQJDVZHVHW
a limit to remote forms of joint enterprise, it is in my view acceptable as a fault 
element. Policy reasons provide a justification for accepting foresight. UK 
government has pointed to the risk of escalation when crimes are committed in 
groups.138 An argument raised by Lord Steyn in Powell and cited in the Law 
Commission Report on Joint Enterprise 139  is that especially young people, 
when acting in groups are more willing to engage in risk-taking and 
criminality.140 Moral theory and the work of scholars such as Jens Ohlin and 
Jonathan Glover support the position that group conduct is more blameworthy 
and hence worthy of criminalisation than individual conduct.141 Policy goals 
certainly play a role in ICL in endorsing joint enterprise and a broad 
interpretation of mens rea. The dolus eventualis test in ICL for ordering has 
been justified by the ICTY µLQOLJKWRIWKHW\SHDQGVHULRXVQHVVRIFULPHVRYHU
which the TriEXQDOKDVMXULVGLFWLRQ¶142  
Joint enterprise liability¶V JUHDWHVW GHPHULW LV arguably WKH µSDULW\ RI
FXOSDELOLW\¶143 and its failure to fairly label criminal conduct.144 PAL and JCE3 
are most problematic in failing to recognise the difference in moral position 
between D2 who has foresight and D1 who has intent with regard to crime B. 
With PAL this lack of differentiation was most pertinent in murder cases since 
it comes with a mandatory life sentence. At least in ICL, judges have discretion 
to impose a sentence they deem appropriate. We can take inspiration from 
WWII case law where quality in guilt did not translate to equality in 
                                                 
137 The exact difference between substantial contribution or significant contribution is not 
entirely clear. See also Boas, supra n 120, at 46±51.  
138 House of Commons, Justice Committee, Joint Enterprise: Joint Enterprise: Follow-up, 4th 
Report of Session 2014-15, para 27. See for a critical reflection on that statement: Green and 
McGourlay, supra n 6. 
139 Law Commission report No 305, para 3.145, at 89. 
140 Lord Steyn UHIHUUHGWRUHVHDUFKE\1..DW\DOµ&RQVSLUDF\WKHRU\¶Yale Law Journal 
DWDQGDQG3)&URPZHOODQGRWKHUVµ*URXSHIIHFWVRQGHFLVLRQ-PDNLQJE\EXUJODUV¶
(1991) Psychological Reports 579 at 586. However, Green and McGourlay are critical, supra n 
6, 292±295, referring to research which supports a counter-hypothesis: B Marshall, B Webb 
and N Tilley, Rationalisation of Current Research on Guns, Gangs and other Weapons (Jill 
Dando Institute of Criminal Science: London, 2005). 
141 -' 2KOLQ µ-RLQW LQWHQWLRQV WR FRPPLW LQWHUQDWLRQDO FULPHV¶  Chicago Journal of 
International Law (2011), 693±753. J Glover & M J Scott-Taggart, 'It Makes no Difference 
Whether or Not I Do It,' 49 Proceedings of the Aristotlean Society, Supplementary Volumes, 
(1975), 171±209. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Law Commission, supra n 140, para 1.5. 
144 6HHDOVR6:D\µ-RLQW(QWHUSULVHWKH1HHGIRU5HIRUPJournal of Criminal Law 326. 
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punishment. :KLOHOLDELOLW\ZDVµIODWWHQHG¶LQWKDWDOOZHUHFRQVLGHUHGHTXDOO\
guilty despite their different roles, sentencing reflected these different roles.  
 
X. Concluding observations  
 
The merits of joint enterprise are clear; it is an effective tool in countering 
collective and organised violence. Its demerits are clear too: PAL, and to a 
certain extent JCE3, are imprecise and blunt instruments. Their use increases 
the risk of guilt by association, on punishment that goes beyond personal 
culpability. This does not mean that collateral liability and foresight should be 
banned altogether. As cause-based liability that is not remote in distance, time 
and place and concerning participants who egg on or instigate the physical 
perpetrator to commit crime A, which results in crime B, collateral liability 
should still be able to generate liability for crime B.   
So to the question whether there is a role for (collateral) joint enterprise 
liability alongside complicity, my response would be: yes. As long as we are 
DZDUHRIMRLQWHQWHUSULVH¶VSURSHQVLW\WRH[SDQG. It is helpful to view the mens 
rea and actus reus elements in terms of a hydraulic relationship or a set of 
scales: when we attach less weight to one, the other should be bolstered. Policy 
choices inform us on how to set this balance. If we want to criminalise collective 
and organised wrongdoing, we bolster the mens rea element at the expense of 
the actus reus element. We need to, however, maintain the right balance. With 
PAL there was an imbalance, which led to over-criminalisation. And there is a 
clear limit: foresight is not an appropriate test for agency-based collateral joint 
enterprise.  
 The Jogee ruling is important as a matter of legal principle.145 Ultimately 
its most compelling outcome is that it allows for a differentiation in sentencing 
in murder cases. Those whose intent was not to cause death can be convicted 
of manslaughter for which there is discretionary sentencing. Jogee gets rid of 
the µstriking anomaly of requiring a lower mental threshold for guilt in the case 
of an accessory than in the case of a principal¶.146  
The real problem in Jogee and the PAL cases before it was mandatory 
sentencing for murder. This is a harsh rule. As we saw in ICL, there is room for 
recognizing role-variance in joint enterprise murder cases. Equal liability does 
not mean equal sentence; it simply enables imputation of the crime committed 
by the principal.  
 
* * * 
 
 
                                                 
145 6HH6LPHVWHUDQG6XOOLYDQ¶VQDW 
146 [84]. 
